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NOTE
THE TOXIC MORTGAGE:
CERCLA SEEPS INTO THE COMMERCIAL
LENDING INDUSTRY
American businesses produce hazardous substances' as a by-
product of their manufacturing, agricultural, and industrial
processes.2 Most of these substances are not destroyed but Are
stored perpetually in hazardous waste disposal sites.3 In the last
decade alone, the number of disposal sites has increased at an
I The term "hazardous waste," in this Note, is used interchangeably with the term
"hazardous substance." "Hazardous substance" is defined in § 9601(14) of the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA"). The
definition includes substances regulated under the following statutory provisions: 1) any
hazardous waste as defined under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
("RCRA"), but not including any waste the regulation of which Congress has suspended; 2)
any hazardous substance named in § 311 of the Clean Water Act; 3) any toxic pollutant
named in § 307 of the Clean Water Act; 4) any hazardous air pollutant under § 112 of the
Clean Air Act; or 5) any imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture under § 7 of
the Toxic Substances Act. See S. BRIGGUM, G. GOLDMAN, D. SquIRE & D. WEINBERG, HAz-
ARDOUS WASTE REGULATION HANDBOOK 64-65 (1985). The Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") has listed 698 elements and compounds as hazardous substances. See 50 Fed. Reg.
13,474-522 (1985).
2 See Note, Developments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HAmv. L. REV. 1458,
1462 (1986). American industry has released into the environment such hazardous sub-
stances as flammables, explosives, nuclear and petroleum fuel by-products, germ-laden re-
fuse, toxic metals and numerous synthetic chemical compounds. Id. Amplifying the problem
is "modern agriculture, with its reliance on chemical pesticides and fertilizers, and modem
methods of animal husbandry." 1 F. GRAD, TEATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAw § 1.02, at 1-9
(1987). In 1986, the EPA estimated that 266 million metric tons of hazardous waste was
produced by industries annually. See Comment, The Liability of Financial Institutions for
Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs Under CERCLA, 1988 Wisc. L. REV. 139, 140.
3 See Note, supra note 2, at 1462. The process of storing waste consists of sealing it in
drums and depositing the drums in clay-lined dumps. Id. The dumps are either placed un-
derground between layers of rock or left in vacant lots, lagoons, or landfills. Id. Of the haz-
ardous waste sites in existence, 74% use containers, 54% use tanks, 17% use surface im-
poundments, 6% incinerate wastes, and 5% use landfills. See CouNcn ON ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY, THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT (1982).
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alarming rate.4 As a result, the deadly consequences of improper
disposal have become readily apparent.5 The Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980
("CERCLA," "Superfund" or the "Act")6 was enacted by Congress
in response to the growing concern" over the hazards and risks as-
sociated with the dramatic increase in hazardous waste sites."
" See H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 17, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6120-21. While the EPA estimhted that in 1979, 30,000-
50,000 inactive and uncontrolled hazardous waste sites existed in America, id., there were
26, 000 sites listed by the EPA in 1987. See Marcotte, Toxic Blackacre: Unprecedented
Liability for Landowners, 73 A.B.A. J. 66, 67 (Nov. 1987). Furthermore, the General Ac-
counting Office indicated that if a more comprehensive study were undertaken, the number
of existing sights reported might be as high as 68,000. Id.
I See Note, supra note 2, at 1462. "Exposure to hazardous wastes can cause cancer,
genetic mutation, birth defects, miscarriages, and damage to the lungs, liver, kidneys, or
nervous system." Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 4, at 18-21, reprinted in 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. Nnws 6119, 6121-22 (describing areas destroyed by hazardous
waste and citing health effects linked to disposal problems); Burkhart, LenderOwners and
CERCLA: Title and Liability, 25 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 317, 317 (1988) (evidence establishes
causal link between toxic chemical exposure and health problems such as cancer, birth de-
fects and personality disorders).
6 Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-
9675 (1983 & Supp. 1989)). CERCLA was a reenactment of the Solid Waste Disposal Act.
See H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 4, at 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 6119, 6119. CERCLA was amended and its funds increased by the Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA"), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9657 (1983 & Supp. 1989)). The fund has grown
from $1.6 billion to $8.5 billion. See Klotz & Siakotos, Lender Liability Under Federal and
State Environmental Law: Of Deep Pockets, Debt Defeat and Deadbeats, 92 Com. L.J. 275,
277 (1987).
7 See H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 4, at 17-18, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6120.
[AJ major new source of environmental concern has surfaced: the tragic conse-
quences of improperly, negligently, and recklessly hazardous waste disposal prac-
tices known as the "inactive hazardous waste site problem." The unfortunate
human health and environmental consequence of these practices has received na-
tional attention amidst growing public and Congressional concern over the magni-
tude of the problem and the appropriate course of response that should be
pursued.
Id.; see also S. COOKE, TnE LAW OF HAzARDous WASTE: MANAGEMENT, CLEANup, LIABILITY
AND LITGATION § 1.01, at 1-3 (1988) ("management of hazardous wastes and the cleanup of
hazardous waste sites... [are] two great areas of public concern"); Comment, The Impact
of the 1986 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act on the Commercial Lending
Industry: A Critical Assessment, 41 U. MIAMI L. REv. 879, 879 (1987) (Congress enacted
CERCLA in response to growing concern over inactive and abandoned hazardous waste
sites).
I See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Federal, state and local governments are
expressing concern in economic terms. See Burkhart, supra note 5, at 318. For example,
cleanup of the environmental disaster at Love Canal cost the government more than $30
million. Id. It was estimated that a "properly secured disposal site" would have cost only
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CERCLA, a broad and complex statute, was purposely designed to
remedy the inadequacies of earlier regulatory legislation.10
Congress first attempted to address the environmental prob-
lem by adopting the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA"),"' which regulated hazardous waste from its generation
four million dollars at the time of disposal. See H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 4, at 20,
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AUmiN. NEws 6119, 6123; see also infra note 10 (dis-
cussion of Love Canal disaster).
9 See 1A F. GRAD, supra note 2, § 4A.02, at 4A-19.
10 See H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 4, at 22, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADmir. NEws 6119, 6125. RCRA has some significant regulatory deficiencies since it "is of
no help if a financially responsible owner of the site cannot be located." Id. Further, the
EPA does not provide funds for the cleanup of inactive sites "when the owner is unknown,
is not responsible, or is financially unable to pay for these costs," and the EPA may only
compel cleanup if the site poses an imminent hazard to the public health. See H.R. RE'. No.
1016, supra note 4, pt. 2, at 4, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AnmiN. NEws 6151,
6153; see also King, Lenders' Liability for Cleanup Costs, 18 ENVTL. L. 241, 253 (1988)
(congressional committee reports indicate Congress intended CERCLA to fill gaps left by
RCRA); Note, When a Security Becomes a Liability: Claims Against Lenders in Hazardous
Waste Cleanup, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1261, 1263 (1987) (CERCLA enacted to close gaps in
federal hazardous waste laws). See generally W. FRAK & T. ATEsoN, SUPERsUND: LMGA-
TION AND CLEANUP 1 (1985) (problem of hazardous waste disposal not addressed in form of
comprehensive legislation, but targeted as amendments to existing environmental
legislation).
A good example of the legislative deficiencies is reflected in the crisis that occurred in
1978 at Love Canal, a New York neighborhood developed over an inactive and abandoned
hazardous waste site. See Glass, Superfund and SARA: Are There Any Defenses Left?, 12
HARv. Emu. L. REv. 385, 387 (1988). Chemicals formerly buried at the site were found in
the water supply and in the ground surface, causing a variety of health problems for Love
Canal residents. Id. Although RCRA regulated hazardous waste at the time, it "did not
authorize the EPA to respond quickly to the release or threatened release of toxic wastes in
an abandoned site." Id. at 388. The EPA was thus limited because RCRA covered only
"active hazardous waste sites; it did not contemplate abandoned sites which may jeopardize
health." Id. In addition, the provisions of the Clean Water Act were insufficient for cleanup
purposes as they applied to only surface water and not ground water. See id.; see also Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
1 Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§
6901-6987 (1983 & Supp. 1989)). The Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965 was "amended, reor-
ganized, and expanded" by RCRA. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3251-3259 (1977). The purpose of
RCRA is to prevent further contamination of the environment by regulating and managing
the creation of new hazardous waste sites. See King, supra note 10, at 243-45. RCRA re-
quires the EPA to identify and maintain a list of hazardous wastes which may be stored or
disposed of only at facilities which fulfill certain EPA restrictions and operate under special
permits. See Note, supra note 2, at 1471. RCRA further imposes restrictions regarding the
maintenance of records of hazardous substances, and the storing and disposing of the haz-
ardous wastes in containers. Id. Further, RCRA also requires a more comprehensive system
of reporting the types of hazardous substances which may be generated, transported or dis-
posed. Id. Failure to satisfy these requirements could result in both civil and criminal penal-
ties. Id.
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to disposal.12 The RCRA, however, failed to provide adequate
guidelines for the cleanup of toxic waste sites existing prior to the
enactment of the statute.'3 In adopting CERCLA, Congress en-
deavored to cure these deficiencies 14 by vesting the federal and
state governments 5 with the authority to respond promptly'6 to
releases' 7 or threatened releases' of hazardous waste substances.
To finance government action, the statute established a $1.6 billion
Superfund e to subsidize the Environmental Protection Agency
12 See Klotz & Siakotos, supra note 6, at 276-77. The goal of RCRA was to pre~ent the
creation of hazardous waste sites, not to cure them. Id.
3 Id. RCRA applies only prospectively and "applies to past sites only to the extent
that they are posing an imminent hazard." See H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 4, at 22,
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN. NEws 6119, 6125; see also United States v.
Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1109 (D.N.J. 1983) (although Congress attempted to address envi-
ronmental problem through previous legislation, it failed to provide relief for consequences
of prior reckless and improper hazardous waste disposal practices).
" See Price, 577 F. Supp. at 1109 (CERCLA was enacted in response to deficiencies in
RCRA); H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 4, at 22, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmiN.
NEws 6119, 6125 ("It is the intent of the Committee... to initiate and establish a compre-
hensive response and financing mechanism to abate and control the vast problems associ-
ated with abandoned and inactive hazardous waste disposal sites").
16 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(a)(1) (Supp. 1989). CERCLA authorizes the President to
commence actions for containment, cleanup and removal of hazardous waste substances. Id.
In addition, the EPA and a state or political subdivision may enter into an agreement where
both take action on a cost-sharing basis. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(c)-(d) (Supp. 1989). Many
states have adopted programs similar to the federal statute, and in some instances impose
even greater obligations. See N.H. Rnv. STAT. ANN. §§ 147-B:2, :10 (1988); OI. REV. STAT. §
469.205 (1987).
16 See United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D.N.H. 1985) (CERCLA en-
acted to provide government with mechanism for prompt and effective response to threats
posed by hazardous waste disposal); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F.
Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982) (same).
17 The term "release" is broadly defined in CERCLA as "any spilling, leaking, pump-
ing, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or dis-
posing into the environment." 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(22) (1983 & Supp. 1989). SARA expanded
the definition to include the "abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers and other
closed receptacles containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant." Id.
18 See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1045 (2d Cir. 1985). The court
in Shore Realty held that the defendant's "suggestion that CERCLA does not impose liabil-
ity for threatened releases" was a frivolous claim. Id. Further, the court stated: "Section
9607(a)(4)(A) imposes liability for 'all costs of removal or remedial action'. The definitions
of 'removal' and 'remedial' explicitly refer to actions 'taken in the event of the threat of
release of hazardous substances'." Id. (citing the Senate Report reprinted in 1 CERCLA
Legislative History at 361). The court also held that leaking tanks and pipelines, continuing
leaching, and seepage from earlier spills and leaking drums, constituted "releases" under
CERCLA. Id. In addition, corrosion and deterioration of tanks, the defendant's lack of ex-
perience and expertise in handling hazardous waste, and the failure to have the facility li-
censed, all amounted to a threat of a release. Id.
9 See Klotz & Siakotos, supra note 6, at 277. CERCLA had established the Hazardous
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("EPA") in the cleanup of contaminated facilities.2 0 After the
cleanup, the EPA may seek reimbursement from the party found
responsible for the contamination. 1
The goal of CERCLA is to fix liability for improper waste dis-
posal.22 The statute holds "potentially responsible parties"
("PRPs"),2s such as owners and operators24 of hazardous waste
Substance Response Trust Fund ("Superfund"). See 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1982) (repealed
1986). Originally, the Superfund was financed primarily through excise taxes on the oil and
chemical industries. See Klotz & Siakotos, supra note 6, at 277. SARA established the Haz-
ardous Substance Superfund, which is in effect a continuation of the Hazardous Substance
Response Trust Fund. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 9507 (Supp. 1989). The federal government is au-
thorized to use the Superfund for governmental responses to hazardous waste problems, to
pay claims arising from the response activities of private parties, and to pay federal and
state governmental bodies for natural resource damage. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9611(a) (Supp.
1989).
20 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(9) (Supp. 1989). CERCLA defines a facility as: "(A) any
building, structure,. .. pipe,... storage container, motor vehicle,. . . or (B) any site or
area where a hazardous substance has been deposited,. . . or otherwise come to be located."
Id. Courts have interpreted this definition broadly. See, e.g., New York v. General Elec. Co.,
592 F. Supp. 291, 297 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (drag strip upon which contaminated oil was placed
for dust control held to be "facility"); United States v. Metate Asbestos Corp., 584 F. Supp.
1143, 1148 (D. Ariz. 1984) (residential trailer park situated next to asbestos mill held to be
"facility" because of presence of asbestos). For purposes of this Note, the terms "facility"
and "site" will be used interchangeably.
21 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4) (Supp. 1989).
22 See H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Ses., pt. 3, at 15, reprinted in 1986 U.S.
CODE CoNO. & ArmN. NEws 3038, 3038. Congress drafted CERCLA as a "broad response
and liability mechanism," and intended the scope of liability to be far-reaching. Comment,
supra note 7, at 884 (quoting H.R. Doe. No. 93, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1983)); see also
CERCLA 1985: A Litigation Update, [15 News & Analysis] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,395, 10,396 (1985) (thrust of CERCLA is to force private parties responsible for release of
hazardous substances to clean up the sites, thereby saving Superfund money for emergency
situations and sites where no responsible parties can be located). CERCLA also serves as a
powerful mechanism on behalf of the government to secure cleanup agreements through
informal negotiations. Id.
23 CERCLA does not formally define "potentially responsible party." However, the
term is frequently used in referring to parties who may be held liable under CERCLA. See 1
C.F.R. § 305.84-4 (1989) (PRPs are "site owners and operators and users of sites such as
transporters and waste generators").
The term "responsible person" is used in CERCLA, though without definition. See 42
U.S.C.A. § 9607(c) (Supp. 1989). For purposes of this paper, PRP will encompass both PRPs
and responsible persons.
24 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(A) (Supp. 1989). CERCLA defines an "owner" or "opera-
tor" as:
(i) in the case of a vessel, any person owning, operating, or chartering by demise,
such vessel, (ii) in the case of an onshore facility or an offshore facility, any person
owning or operating such facility, and (iii) in the case of any facility, title or con-
trol of which was conveyed due to bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency, aban-
donment, or similar means to a unit of State or local government, any person who
owned, operated or otherwise controlled activities at such facility immediately be-
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sites, and generators and transporters of hazardous waste, 25 strictly
liable26 for the costs of the cleanup. Excluded from liability are
persons2 7 who do not participate in the management of the facility
but who hold "indicia of ownership primarily to protect [their] se-
curity interest[s] in the... facility. 21 8 The enormity of the haz-
ardous waste problem,2 '9 coupled with the sparsity of substantial
forehand. Such term does not include a person, who, without participating in the
management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect
his security interest in the vessel or facility.
Id.
Id See id. § 9607(a). The theory behind § 9607 is to impose liability not only on those
who directly benefited from the hazardous waste site, i.e., the generators, transporters, and
operators, but also on persons benefiting indirectly by virtue of the site's operation, i.e., a
site owner who does not directly operate it. See Burkhart, supra note 5, at 334-35; see also
infra note 27 and accompanying text (defining "person" under CERCLA).
Some commentators have found lenders to be within the group receiving an indirect
benefit from the operation of the hazardous waste site since the lender receives principal
and interest payments produced by the site's operation. See Burkhart, supra note 5, at 335,
26 Although Congress specifically deleted the strict liability provision contained in the
original Senate bill, it stated that CERCLA liability shall be construed as liability under §
311 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1982), which has been construed as a strict
liability provision. See City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1140
n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1982). Thus, courts have interpreted CERCLA as imposing strict liability. See,
e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985) (CERCLA imposes
strict liability on current owner of facility without regard to causation); United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 843-45 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (in-
tent of Congress in passing CERCLA was to impose strict'liability standard), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); United States
v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1113-14 (D.N.J. 1983) (legislative history of CERCLA indicates
standard of strict liability, subject only to affirmative defenses listed in 42 U.S.C. § 107(b)).
Courts have also held CERCLA liability to be joint and several among responsible par-
ties when the harm is indivisible. See, e.g., United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053,
1060 (C.D. Cal. 1987); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 589 F. Supp. 59, 63 (W.D.
Mo. 1984); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 811 (S.D. Ohio 1983). This
feature encourages the EPA to focus its actions on large, commercial entities with "deep
pockets." See Klotz & Siakotos, supra note 6, at 279. CERCLA liability has also been con-
strued to apply retroactively. See Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 810 F.2d at 732-34.
27 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(21) (Supp. 1989). CERCLA defines a "person" as "an individ-
ual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity,
United States Government, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State,
or any interstate body." Id.
" Id. § 9601 (20)(A). The policy behind this provision was to encourage the extension
of credit by not including lenders within the CERCLA liability scheme. See Berz & Sexton,
Superfund Collides with Lenders' Concerns, Legal Times, Dec. 23, 1985. Congress at-
tempted to strike a balance between this policy and CERCLA's policy of imposing liability
on deep-pocket defendants by restricting the exemption to lenders who do not participate in
the management of borrowers' facilities. Id.
19 See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text; see also Burkhart, supra note 5, at 321
(magnitude of damage resulting from improperly disposed hazardous waste and enormous
cost of cleaning up contaminated waste justify broad net of liability).
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legislative history 0 to aid in clarifying CERCLA's ambiguous lia-
bility provisions,31 led courts to extend liability to parties which
have only tangential relations with the polluted site.3 2 The enact-
ment of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
("SARA") in 19863 affirmed this extension by tacitly adopting the
judicially created scope of liability3 4 and expanding the Superfund
tax base.3 5 Congress' action reflected a policy that pollution of the
30 See, e.g., United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 905-06 (D.N.H. 1985) (CER-
CLA carries virtually no direct legislative history); United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp.
1103, 1109 (D.N.J. 1983) (because of haste in CERCLA's adoption, Congress unable to pro-
vide a clarifying committee report); Comment, supra note 7, at 886 ("few committee reports
are available to clarify legislative intent").
31 See, e.g., Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 579 F. Supp. at 838 n.15 (courts placed in
position of construing inadequately drawn legislation "marred by vague terminology and
deleted provisions"); Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 1-
2 (1982) (CERCLA's legislative history is confusing and sparse); Comment, supra note 7, at
886 (CERCLA is a particularly difficult statute for the judiciary to interpret because ambi-
guities and material omissions often obfuscate the intended meaning of its provisions").
'2 See Comment, Lender Liability for Hazardous Waste: An Economic and Legal
Analysis, 59 U. COLO. L. REv. 659, 662 (1988). Some courts have reasoned that since Con-
gress intended the "owner and operator" definitions to be interpreted broadly, any party
having an interest in a hazardous waste facility faces CERCLA liability. Id.; see, e.g., North-
eastern Pharmaceutical, 579 F. Supp. at 847-49 (vice president and shareholder was held
personally liable for wastes disposed of by corporation); United States v. Argent Corp., [14
Litigation] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,616, 20,616 (D.N.M. 1984) (owner/lessor is
potentially liable party under CERCLA); United States v. Carolawn Co., [14 Litigation]
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,698, 20,698-99 (D.S.C. 1984) (imposing CERCLA liability
on firm which held title for one hour in order to transfer property).
33 Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9657
(Supp. 1989).
3, See Comment, supra note 7, at 894. SARA revised and expanded many of CERCLA's
provisions, most notably the innocent landowner affirmative defense. See infra note 62 and
accompanying text. In addition, Congress expanded liability by providing that a landowner
may be liable for selling property without disclosing a known hazardous waste condition, 42
U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(c) (Supp. 1989), and by increasing the monetary amount of potential
liability. Id. § 9601(24); see also Klotz & Siakotos, supra note 6, at 281 (SARA's increasing
amount of potential monetary liability is likely to raise average cost of cleanup from nine
million to between $30 and $50 million).
SARA also enables the government to place a federal lien on contaminated property to
ensure that owners of property which has been cleaned up at the government's expense will
not receive a windfall profit when the property is subsequently sold. See 42 U.S.C.A. §
9607(1) (Supp. 1989); Klotz & Siakotos, supra note 6, at 295. The lien, however, is not a
"superlien" and therefore is subordinated to secured interests perfected prior to the filing of
the federal lien. Id.
Congress, however, made no substantial changes to the overall liability scheme. See
Comment, supra note 2, at 155 nn.71 & 74; see also Note, Successor Liability of Financial
Institutions Under CERCLA-A Takings and Policy Analysis, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REv.
243, 244 (SARA does not represent major change in philosophy regarding liability).
5 See 26 U.S.C.A. § 9507 (Supp. 1989). SARA increased the Superfund to $8.5 billion.
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environment is a societal problem, the burden of which should rest
not only on those primarily responsible for the pollution but also
on a wider range of parties.36
The most recent area to feel the impact of CERCLA liability
has been the commercial lending industry.3 7 Congress drafted the
security interest exemption to afford protection to lenders ex-
tending credit.38 However, narrow constructions of the security in-
terest exemption and the third party affirmative defense40 indi-
cate that a lender is potentially responsible for CEROLA response
costs notwithstanding the fact that the lender did not participate
Id. Under SARA, the financing of the Superfund would come from "excise taxes on petro-
leum and feedstock chemicals, a new excise tax on imported chemical derivatives, and a new
environmental income tax." King, supra note 10, at 255 n.62 (1988). In addition, $1.25 bil-
lion of general revenue appropriations are targeted for the Superfund. Id.
38 See, e.g., Schwenke, Environmental Liabilities Imposed on Landowners, Tenants,
and Lenders-How Far Can and Should They Extend?, [18 News & Analysis] ENVr. L.
REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,361, 10,362 (1988) ("Senate Finance Committee report, in support
of a broadening of the tax base through general fund subsidies, recognized that cleanup of
abandoned hazardous waste sites was a 'broad societal problem' . . . [and) that costs of
cleanup must now be apportioned over a broader range of parties").
37 See infra notes 66-108 and accompanying text; see also Fleischaker & Mitchell, The
Insecurities of Security Interests in Hazardous Waste Cases, 9 Nat'l L.J. 18, 20 (Sept. 15,
1986) (outlining increasing risks in industrial loan transactions). Lenders are especially con-
cerned about the prospect of liability because insurance companies typically do not cover
liability for hazardous waste related injuries and cleanup costs. See Adler & Broiles, The
Pollution Exclusion: Implementing the Social Policy of Preventing Pollution Through the
Insurance Policy, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 1251, 1251-60 (1986).
CERCLA also affects lenders because the imposition of cleanup costs, fines, criminal
penalties and injunctive relief seriously affects a borrower's ability to repay loans. See, e.g.,
King, supra note 10, at 265 (imposition of fines, criminal sanctions, injunctive relief, and
adverse publicity have negative influence on borrower's financial condition and ability to
meet financial obligations); Rosenbaum, Bankruptcy and Environmental Regulation: An
Emerging Conflict, [13 News & Analysis] ENvmL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,099, 10,099
(1983) (skyrocketing costs of environmental cleanup have forced some companies out of bus-
iness). See generally Lockett & Soriano, Hazardous Waste Liability: The Emerging Prob-
lem for Lenders, 1986 CHEM. WASTE LiTG. REP. 45 (discussion of CERCLA's effect on lend-
ers' rights when borrower is bankrupt). In addition, a lender's ability to recoup its loan may
be affected by the enactment of state "Superliens," which take priority over liens of secured
creditors. See, e.g., In re Berg Chem. Co., No. 82-B 12052(HB) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 9,
1984) (order granting City of New York First Lien and Superpriority).
38 See H.R. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 36, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6160, 6181.
*1 See United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 580 (D. Md.
1986). But see United States v. Mirabie, [15 Litigation] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
20,993, 20,994 (E.D. Pa. 1985); In re T.P. Long Chem., Inc., 45 Bankr. 278, 288-89 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1985).
'o See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1048-49 (2d Cir. 1985)
(affirmative defense of third party ); see also infra notes 62-65 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing affirmative defenses).
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in the management of the facility or in the generation or transpor-
tation of the hazardous waste.41
This Note will address first the background and structure of
CERCLA, specifically focusing on its liability -and defense provi-
sions. It will then examine the developing liability of lenders as
owners and operators under CERCLA and the security interest ex-
emption, and suggest a dual analysis in determining the proper
scope of this liability. Finally, this Note will analyze the rationale
behind subjecting lenders to potential liability and suggest lending
procedures that would protect a lender's rights in a loan agree-
ment, while still furthering the goals and policies of efficient haz-
ardous waste management.
I. STATUTORY OVERVIEW
CERCLA was enacted in 1980 during the final days of the
96th Congress. 42 Though it emerged only after six years of work in
the House and three in the Senate,43 the final bill was a hastily
drafted compromise between one Senate" and two House bills.45
Thus, "[a]lthough Congress had worked on 'Superfund' toxic and
hazardous waste cleanup bills ... the actual bill which became
law had virtually no legislative history" to assist in interpreting the
Act's liability provisions.4 In addition, Congress specifically de-
leted from the final Act certain provisions regarding the standard
of liability, leaving the issue for judicial determination through
common law principles.47 As a result, courts have played a signifi-
"1 See Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 577-82.
"See Grad, supra note 80, at 1. CERCLA was adopted by a "lame duck" Congress
prior .to the beginning of the Reagan administration. Id. Due to the results of numerous
congressional studies and the tragedy at Love Canal, Congress was determined to have the
proposed legislation enacted prior to the end of its term. See Glass, supra note 10, at 388-
89.
"3 See 1 ENwL. L. INST., SuFERFUND: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY xiii (1982). The 96th Con-
gress considered four major bills. "Three of these bills... were fully developed... with
hearings, committee reports, amendments and floor debates." Id. The fourth bill never went
beyond the committee stage. Id.
4" See S. 1480, 96th Cong., 2d Seass., 126 CONG. Rac. 30,898 (1980).
15 See H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Seass., 126 CONG. Rac. 26,336, 26,757 (1980); H.R. 85,
95th Cong., 2d Seass., 126 CONG. REc. 26,194, 26,369 (1980).
46 See Grad, supra note 30, at 1.
4 See 126 CONG. Rac. 31,965 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1980). Representative Florio, who intro-
duced one of the proposed CERCLA bills, stated thas the provisions providing for joint and
several liability were deleted so that courts could determine the standard under common
law principles. Id.
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cant role in defining, construing and expanding the scope of haz-
ardous waste liability.
CERCLA provides the EPA with a dual mechanism for the
cleanup of a site contaminated by the release, or threatened re-
lease, of a hazardous substance. First, through its power delegated
by the President,48 the EPA may order the responsible party to
clean up the site. 9 Second, the EPA itself may clean the site, 0
financed by money from the Superfund, and subsequently sue the
responsible party for reimbursement. 51 Response costs include ex-
penses for the removal"2 of the toxic material or any other neces-
sary remedial actions,"' any harm or destruction to natural re-
sources,54  the "planning and implementation of a response
action,"5 and "the costs of any health assessment or health effects
stud[ies]" undertaken pursuant to statutory authority.5
48 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9606(a) (1983). Section 9606(a) enables the President to order an
abatement of a hazardous condition that poses "an imminent and substantial endangerment
to the public health or welfare or the environment." Id. This power was delegated to the
Administrator of the EPA. See Exec. Order No. 12,580, 3 C.F.R. § 193 (1988), reprinted in
42 U.S.C.A. § 9615 (Supp. 1989).
49 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(a) (Supp. 1989). A refusal to obey a cleanup order can result
in a fine of up to $25,000 a day. See id. § 9606(b)(1).
50 See id. § 9604(1)(B). Any response activity undertaken by the EPA must include the
"'necessary costs of response [and be] consistent with the national contingency plan.'"
Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1429 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. §
9607(a)(4)(B) (1983)). The EPA initiates removal action, which may include "removing re-
leased hazardous substances, monitoring [the site], limiting access, or temporarily evacuat-
ing the area." S. BRIGGum, G. GOLDMAN, D. SQUIRE & D. WEINBERG, supra note 1, at 100.
The EPA may take remedial action only at sites which are listed on the National Priorities
List ("NPL"). Id. at 101. But see New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1045-46
(2d Cir. 1985) (NPL inclusion is not a prerequisite for state to recover response costs).
51 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a) (Supp. 1989). To recover response costs, the EPA must
establish that- "1) [t]he site is a 'facility;' 2) [a] 'release' or 'threatened release' of any 'haz-
ardous substance' from the site has occurred; 3) [tlhe release or threatened release has
caused the United States to incur 'response costs'; and 4) [t]he defendant is one of the
persons designated as a party liable for costs." United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust
Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 576 (D. Md. 1986).
'2 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (Supp. 1989). CERCLA defines "removal" as includ-
ing any actions necessary to 1) clean up or remove hazardous substances; 2) "monitor, as-
sess, and evaluate the release"; 3) dispose of removed material; or 4) "prevent, minimize, or
mitigate damage to the public ... or to the environment." Id. § 9601(23).
53 See id. § 9607(a)(4)(A). CERCLA defines "remedial action" as including actions
"consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in addition to removal actions" in
order "to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous substances." Id. § 9601(24).
5' See id. § 9607(a)(4)(C).
56 United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 850
(W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 848 (1987).
- 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(D) (Supp. 1989).
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I. LImBITY PROVISIONS
The EPA is authorized to seek recovery for response costs
against four categories of PRPs. First, persons who are the current
owners or operators of the hazardous waste site are potentially lia-
ble.17 Courts have construed this category literally so that a cur-
rent, innocent owner is liable despite the fact that the dumping
occurred during a prior ownership."8 Second, liability is imposed on
persons who owned or operated the facility at the time of the haz-
ardous waste disposal,59 thus insuring that a "polluter" cannot es-
cape liability by selling the contaminated property.0 The third
and fourth categories are the generators and the transporters of
hazardous waste."'
III. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
CERCLA liability is subject to certain enumerated defenses. A
PRP can escape liability by establishing that the release or
threatened release of hazardous substances resulted solely from an
act of God, an act of war, an unrelated third party, or any combi-
nation of the above.0 2 The third party defense, the most hotly liti-
gated of the affirmative defenses, applies only if the third party is
11 See id. § 9607(a)(1).
Is See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1043-45 (2d Cir. 1985).
41 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(2) (Supp. 1989).
'1 See id. This category has been construed to include a past owner or operator only if
the hazardous substances were stored during the time he owned or operated the site. See
Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., [14 Litigation] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 20,376, 20,378 (C.D. CaL 1984).
61 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(3) (Supp. 1989). Liability exists under this subsection
when "any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treat-
ment,... of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party
or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity
and containing such hazardous substances." Id. This provision is construed broadly, and a
company which generates one percent or less of the total volume of hazardous substances at
a site may be forced to pay for the cleanup of the entire site. See generally Moore & Kowal-
ski, When is One Generator Liable for Another's Waste?, 33 CLEv. ST. L. Rnv. 93, 94-105
(1984-85) (discussing CERCLA decisions that address joint and several liability and causa-
tion issues involving small generators of wastes).
Section 9607 imposes liability for a release upon "any person who accepts or accepted
any hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration ves-
sels or sites selected by such person." 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4) (Supp. 1989).
62 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(b) (1983). In 1986, SARA created a new definition for the
third party defense. See H.R. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. Rc. H9094-85
(daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986). The revised definition was intended to clarify the CERCLA goal of
imposing liability only on those responsible for the creation of the hazardous waste and not
on innocent subsequent purchasers. Id.
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not an agent or employee of the PRP or one in a contractual rela-
tionship with the PRP.6 3 Moreover, the PRP must establish that
due care was exercised 4 and precautions were taken "against fore-
seeable acts or omissions of any such third party." 5
IV. SECURITY INTEREST EXEMPTION
The security interest exemption of CERCLA s seemed to af-
ford a lender a safe harbor from classification as an owner or oper-
ator, provided that title was held primarily to protect a security
interest and the lender did not participate in the management of
the borrower's hazardous waste site.6 7 Courts have disagreed, how-
63 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(b)(3) (1983). The definition of "contractual relationship," for
the purposes of a § 9607(b)(3) defense, includes "land contracts, deeds or other instruments
transferring title or possession." Id. § 9601(35)(A) (Supp. 1989). Generally, a PRP is pre-
cluded from raising the innocent landowner defense if the PRP was in a "contractual rela-
tionship" with a third party responsible for the release of a hazardous substance. See id. §
9607(b)(3) (1983).
SARA created a statutory exception to the definition of a "contractual relationship" if,
at the time the PRP acquired the facility, the PRP "did not know and had no reason to
know" of the disposal of a hazardous substance. See id. § 9601(35)(A)(i) (Supp. 1989). The
PRP must also establish that after obtaining actual knowledge of the presence of the haz-
ardous substance, due care with respect to the substance was exercised and precautions
against foreseeable acts or omissions of the third party was taken. See id. § 9607(b)(3)
(1983); Comment, supra note 7, at 896. This defense is quite narrow, however, because §
9601(35)(B) imposes a stringent duty of inquiry on potential land owners. See id. §
9601(35)(B) (Supp. 1989). The PRP "must have undertaken, at the time of acquisition, all
appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and uses of the property consistent with
good commercial or customary practice in an effort to minimize liability." Id. For purposes
of the foregoing, the court must consider any "specialized knowledge or experience" the
PRP possesses, "commonly known or reasonably ascertainable information about the prop-
erty, the obviousness of the. . . contamination" or threatened contamination of the prop-
erty, and the ability to detect it. Id.
Lenders faced with potential CERCLA liability will have great difficulty in establishing
this defense because of the strict duty of inquiry. See James, Financial Institutions and
Hazardous Waste Litigation: Limiting the Exposure to Superfund Liability, 28 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 329, 337-38 (1988). The duty of inquiry will be especially difficult to satisfy since
CERCLA's legislative history indicates that "ft]hose engaged in commercial transactions
should ... be held to a higher standard [of inquiry] than those who are engaged in private
residential transactions." H.R. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REc. H9085
(daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986).
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(b)(3)(a) (1983).
15 See id. § 9607(b)(3)(b).
e8 See id. § 9601(20)(A) (Supp. 1989). The definition of "owner or operator" excludes "a
person, who, without participating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of
ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility." Id.
67 See id.; see also United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., [19 Litigation] Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,529, 20,530-31 (S.D. Ga. 1988) (secured creditor who "did not own, oper-
ate or ... control activities at the facility" not liable under CERCLA despite participation
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ever, as to whether this exemption applies to a foreclosing lender
who acquires ownership of the property to satisfy a secured debt."'
It is submitted that these conflicting decisions can be reconciled by
applying a dual analysis of lender liability, which includes an eval-
uation of the status of the lender after foreclosure followed by an
assessment of lender participation in the management of the
facility.
In In re T.P. Long Chemical, Inc.,69 a lender holding a per-
fected security interest was held not to be an owner or operator of
a bankrupt debtor's hazardous waste site.70 After finding the
debtor and his estate liable as owners, 1 the court refused to ex-
tend liability to the secured creditor, BancOhio, when the bank-
ruptcy estate was unable to pay the EPA's claim 2 After finding
that the removal of the hazardous waste did not benefit BancOio
in the preservation or sale of its collateral, the court further stated
in dicta, that even if BancOhio had foreclosed, it would not have
acquired "owner" status since BancOhio acted only to preserve its
security interest, and hence fell within the ambit of the security
interest exemption. 3
in public auction of site's equipment and inventory).
6" Compare United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 579 (D.
Md. 1986) (exemption does not apply to foreclosing lender who retained property four
years) with United States v. Mirabile, [15 Litigation] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,993,
20,994 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (exemption does apply where lender foreclosed and subsequently
assigned the land).
41 45 Bankr. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985). In Long, BancOhio National Bank
("BancOhio") held a "perfected security interest in the accounts receivable, equipment, fix-
tures, and other personal property" belonging to the Longs rubber recycling plant. Id. at
280. In 1982, after filing for bankruptcy, the Long's personal property was auctioned off,
except for buried drums containing hazardous wastes. Id. at 281. Since the drums were part
of the property, they were subject to BancOhio's security interest. Id. These drums were
discovered by the EPA, which had undertaken remedial action following the release of an-
other hazardous substance on the property. Id. The EPA sought reimbursement out of the
funds held by the bankruptcy trustee which were subject to BancOhio's security interest. Id.
at 280.
10 Id. at 288-89.
71 Id. at 284. The trustee for the bankrupt estate argued that since the drums were not
auctioned off with the rest of the property, they were abandoned pursuant to § 554(c) of the
Bankruptcy Code and the interest therein reverted to the debtor. Id. at 284-85. The court
rejected this argument, noting that in addition to the trustee's failure to take positive steps
to abandon the drums, CERCLA's liability scheme prohibits any transfer of potential liabil-
ity. Id. at 285; see 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(e)(1) (1983).
72 Long, 45 Bankr. at 288-89.
73 Id. The court found that there was no benefit to BancOhio since BancOhio's collat-
eral was sold prior to the commencement of the EPA's removal action. Id. at 288. Conse-
quently, the EPA's expenditures could not be considered a traditional "cost incident to the
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In United States v. Mirabile,4 the EPA filed a CERCLA re-
imbursement claim against the Mirabiles, the current owners of a
hazardous waste site. The Mirabiles sought contribution from
American Bank and Trust Company ("ABT") and Mellon Bank
(East) National Association ("Mellon Bank"), 5 two banks which
had loaned money to the site's former corporate owner, Turco.7 6
Following dismissal of Turco's bankruptcy proceedings, ABT fore-
closed and acquired ownership of the property at the foreclosure
sale.77 Having taken certain actions with respect to the property,78
ABT assigned it to the Mirabiles four months after acquiring own-
ership.79 Granting ABT's motion for summary judgment, 0 the dis-
trict court noted that even though ABT had acquired full title to
the property, its "actions with respect to foreclosure were pla"nly
undertaken in an effort to protect [its] security interest in the
property."81 In addition, the Mirabile court held that the bank's
financial involvement in the property was incident to holding the
security interest, and its participation in purely financial aspects of
the operation did not reach the level of participation that would
justify the imposition of CERCLA owner liability. 2
The court faced a "cloudier situation" with respect to Mellon
sale of property." Id. Furthermore, since the drums "had no value as collateral" the EPA's
expenditures were not a cost of preserving the bank's "collateral." Id. The court found that
the only "indicia of ownership" exercised by BancOhio was "to protect its security interest."
Id. at 289. It was also undisputed that BancOhio did not participate in the management of
the waste site. Id.
71 [15 Litigation] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994, (E.D. Pa. 1985).
71 Id. at 20,995. The Mirabiles alleged that the banks had, through their financial deal-
ings with the previous owner, Turco, assisted in creating the hazardous conditions at the
site. Id. at 20,996. The banks in turn counterclaimed against the United States, claiming
that the Small Business Administration's involvement at the site created the condition. Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
7 "Id. These activities consisted of securing the building against vandalism by boarding
up windows and changing locks, making inquiries as to the cost of disposing of drums lo-
cated on the property, and, through its loan officer, visiting the site several times for the
purpose of showing it to potential buyers. Id. at 20,995.
70 Id. at 20,996.
80 Id. at 20,997. ABT also argued in its motion that under Pennsylvania law, ownership
acquired through the sheriff's sale vested ABT with only equitable title, which never rip-
ened into legal title by virtue of the assignment of the bid to the Mirabiles. Id. at 20,996.
The court found this argument to be irrelevant, and relied solely on the security interest
exemption. Id. at 20,996.
81 Id.
82 Id.
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Bank. 3 When Turco experienced financial difficulties, Mellon
Bank became increasingly involved in the company's operations."4
The court denied Mellon Bank's motion for summary judgment
and noted that, while a lender's financial involvement in its bor-
rower's affairs usually would not trigger owner liability,85 involve-
ment constituting participation in the operational, production or
waste disposal activities would impose such liability on the
lender.a8
The Long and Mirabile courts restricted lender liability based
exclusively on the security interest exemption without considering
the impact of foreclosure. In so doing, it is suggested that the
courts employed reasoning inconsistent with the history and goals
of CERCLA liability and created a class of landowners exempt
from liability "based on an artificial distinction drawn from the
circumstances by which the realty was acquired. '8 7 It is submitted
that before a court addresses the security interest exemption of
CERCLA, the interest of the lender in the property should first be
determined.
In United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.,88 suit was
filed against Maryland Bank & Trust ("MB&T"), which had fore-
83 Id. at 20,997.
"9 Id. For example, one of Mellon Bank's loan officers was a member of Turco's Advi-
sory Board, while another provided post-bankruptcy oversight of the company. Id. One of
the loan officers stated in his deposition that he became involved with Turco because Mel-
lon Bank wanted him to have more of a "day-to-day hands-on involvement including moni-
toring the cash collateral accounts, ensuring that receivables went to the proper account,
and establishing a reporting system between the company and the bank." Id. Although this
activity alone would not justify liability, the court concluded that additional testimony ren-
dered uncertain the actual extent of Mellon Bank's involvement. Id.
85 Id. at 20,995-97. The Mirabile court found the following types of involvement insuffi-
cient to hold the lender liable as an owner: 1) establishing a ceiling on dividends and salaries
payable to the borrower's officer; 2) retaining the authority to approve the purchasing of life
insurance for the borrower's employees; 3) general involvement in the accounting and
records of the borrower; and 4) assisting the borrower with marketing or sales strategies in
activities which do not specifically involve the generation, disposal, or storage of hazardous
wastes. Id.
66 Id. at 20,996.
3" See Note, supra note 10, at 1286.
E8 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986). In the 1970s, Maryland Bank & Trust Co.
("MB&T") loaned money to Herschel McLeod, Sr., for use in his trash and garbage busi-
ness. Id. at 575. In 1972, McLeod allowed the dumping of hazardous waste on a piece of
property owned by him. Id. In 1980, McLeod's son bought his father's property with financ-
ing from MB&T. Id. MB&T instituted a foreclosure action against the property in 1981 and
purchased it in 1982 after the son defaulted on the loan payments. Id. The EPA instituted a
cleanup action on the site in 1983, after MB&T failed to commence corrective action at the
site. Id. The EPA's response costs were approximately $551,000. Id. at 576.
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closed and purchased contaminated property. 9 In support of its
motion for summary judgment, the bank relied on the security in-
terest exemption and on the third party defense.e0 In holding
MB&T liable, the court initially focused on whether MB&T was an
owner and operator as defined by CERCLA. Although the language
of the applicable provision appears to cover only persons who were
both the owner and the operator,9 1 the court construed the word-
ing disjunctively, finding that ownership alone was sufficient to im-
pose liability. In rejecting a defense based on the security interest
exemption, the court noted that "[t]he verb tense of the exclusion-
ary language is critical. The security interest must exist at the time
of the clean-up." 2 The court determined that upon the lender's
foreclosure and subsequent purchase of the property at the foreclo-
sure sale, the security interest terminated and the lender's interest
ripened into full title, thereby effectively negating the security in-
terest exemption. It is submitted that this line of reasoning re-
flects Congress' intent in drafting the security interest exemption
and is in accordance with the principles underlying modern lend-
ing laws.94
The MB&T court noted that Congress drafted the security in-
terest exemption to give lenders in different states equal protection
11 Id. at 575. MB&T still owned the property when the trial commenced four years
later. Id.
90 Id. at 576. The court reserved judgment on the third party defense until after trial.
Id. at 581-82.
91 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a) (Supp. 1989). The MB&T court noted that proper gram-
matical usage would hold liable only persons who were both owners and operators, but con-
cluded that to "slavishly follow the laws of grammar while interpreting acts of Congress
would violate sound canons of statutory interpetation." Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F.
Supp. at 578. Furthermore, since an owner could not be the same person as an operator,
allowing such a definition would render the provision "totally useless." Id. In addition, this
argument would be inconsistent with CERCLA's imposition of strict liability, as a land-
owner would be liable only if he had actually participated in the operation of the hazardous
waste site. Id.; see also United States v. Argent Corp., 21 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1354, 1356
(D.N.M. 1984) ("CERCLA's legislative history shows a deliberate omission.. . . of language
. ..which would have required participation in management or in operation as prerequisite
to owner liability").
'1 Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 579.
92 Id. The court concluded that IB&T purchased the property to protect its invest-
ment, not to protect its security interest, as the security interest existed only during the life
of the mortgage. Id.
1' See Note, supra note 10, at 1289. "Mortgage law makes no distinction in the charac-
ter of ownership acquired by a mortgagee when it purchases the mortgage property.... [A
mortgagee in possession] is personally liable for tort injuries resulting from its use of the
property or its failure to perform duties imposed by law upon landowners." Id.
TOXIC MORTGAGE
despite differences in state lending laws9 -In lien theory states, the
lender acquires a security interest in the property and retains only
the right to sell the property if the borrower defaults. 8 In title
theory states, however, the property is actually conveyed to the
lender who retains title by operation of the common law.97 The
MB&T court, finding support in CERCLA's legislative history, dis-
tinguished between title theory ownership and ownership acquired
through foreclosure, and held that the security interest exemption
does not cover "former mortgagees- currently holding title after
purchasing the property at a foreclosure sale."98
Policy considerations also played a factor in the court's deter-
mination of liability.9" Allowing MB&T to escape liability would
have resulted in unjust enrichment in that lenders could acquire
the property cheaply at the foreclosure sale, free of potential liabil-
ity, and, following an EPA funded cleanup, sell the sanitized prop-.
erty at a profit.100 In addition, exempting lenders/owners would
have been inconsistent with CERCLA's purpose and statutory
scheme and "would [have] convert[ed] CERCLA into an insurance
scheme for financial institutions, protecting them against possible
losses due to the security of loans with polluted properties." 10 1
The court in MB&T narrowly construed Mirabile, concluding
that it would apply only to situations where the mortgagee-turned-
owner promptly assigned the property, since the history and poli-
cies underlying CERCLA did not support a more generous inter-
pretation of the security interest exemption.102
While MB&T essentially eviscerated the security interest ex-
emption for foreclosing lenders who acquire ownership of the con-
taminated property, a recent decision in the Southern District of
Georgia indicates that a nonforeclosing lender will come within the
security interest exemption standard set forth in Mirabile. In
United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.,10 3 the court refused to im-
" Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 579.
06 See G. NELSON & D. WHrTMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 4.1, at 142-45 (2d ed.
1985).
"Id.
98 Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 579.
See id. at 579-80.
" Id. at 580.
1o Id.
10 Id.
13 [19 Litigation] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,529 (S.D. Ga. 1988). Fleet Factors
Corp. ("Fleet") had entered into a factoring agreement in 1976 with Swainson Print Works,
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pose CERCLA "operator" liability on a lender who had liquidated
its borrower's equipment and inventory, but who had not fore-
closed on the property. 0 4 Conceding that Fleet Factors Corpora-
tion ("Fleet"), the lender, was not an owner or operator, the De-
partment of Justice maintained that Fleet's activities constituted
participation in the management of the facility and therefore ne-
gated a defense based on the security interest exemption. 105 The
Fleet Factors court, however, expanded the liability standards of
Mirabile, and concluded that a lender can give general financial
assistance and "even isolated instances of specific, management
advice to its creditors without risking CERCLA liability if the se-
cured creditor does not participate in the day-to-day management
of the business or facility either before or after the business ceases
operation." 06
It is submitted that although the reasoning in MB&T and
Fleet Factors may appear inconsistent, the actual result reached in
each case was correct. Where a lender has foreclosed and subse-
quently assumed ownership, as in the MB&T situation, it should
be held liable as an owner or operator unless it can successfully
establish one of the CERCLA affirmative defenses.10 7 By focusing
Inc. ("Swainson"), providing Swainson with operating funds in exchange for Swainson's as-
signment of its accounts receivable. Id. In 1979, Swainson filed for bankruptcy. Id. at 20,530.
Fleet and Swainson continued with their arrangement until 1981, when Swainson was adju-
dicated a bankrupt. Id. In 1982, Fleet was allowed to hire a liquidator and foreclose on the
inventory and equipment. Id. The Department of Justice (the 'Tepartment") argued that
Fleet contributed to or caused the contamination of the site in that during the course of the
liquidation auction and in removing certain machinery, Fleet's salvager caused a release of
friable asbestos from the pipes connected to the machinery. Id. In addition, the Department
maintained that even though a bankruptcy trustee had been appointed, Fleet controlled
access to the property and retained the authority for the removal of machinery and equip-
ment that was not sold at the auction or removed by the purchaser. Id. The Department
also emphasized that prior to foreclosing, Fleet retained veto power over whether credit
would be extended to certain customers. Id. The court, however, found this to be a "normal
practice for a secured lender." Id.
"I See id.
105 Id. at 20,531.
100 Id. Significantly, "although [the Justice Department] provided evidence of Fleet's
day-to-day involvement in [Swainson's] operations during the liquidation, these facts were
not even acknowledged in the court's opinion." Lender Liability Under CERCLA: The Im-
pact of Fleet Factors, Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 701 (Mar. 20, 1989).
107 See Burcat, Foreclosure and United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.; Paying
the Piper or Learning How to Dance to a New Tune?, [17 News & Analysis] EnvtL L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,098, 10,099-100 (1987). The MB&T court has been criticized for its rea-
soning since it could have imposed liability through an "analysis of basic principles of the
law of mortgage foreclosure, rather than speculative public policy arguments." Id.
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on the owner/operator issue, the lender would be held liable to the
same extent as any other PRP which acquired ownership of con-
taminated property,108 and would thus be precluded from reaping a
profit at the government's expense.
If the lender has not foreclosed, or foreclosed without acquir-
ing ownership, the inquiry should focus on the security interest ex-
emption. It is suggested that a court should focus, as in Fleet Fac-
tors and Mirabile, on the extent of the lender's involvement in the
facility to determine whether or not the purpose of participation
was primarily to preserve its security interest. If the activities sur-
pass the threshold set forth in those cases, the lender should be
held liable as a CERCLA operator.
V. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CERCLA LENDER LIABILITY
Although the increased scope of CERCLA liability leaves lend-
ers with very few options,109 subjecting lenders to potential CER-
CLA liability will encourage safer hazardous waste disposal prac-
tices 10 and foster improved lending procedures., First, the
limited availability of the third party defense will urge lenders to
scrutinize more carefully the practices and activities of those seek-
ing credit.12 Consequently, a potential borrower may be deterred
108 See Comment, supra note 2, at 177 (lender who foreclosed, bidded, and assumed
ownership should be held liable to same extent as any other bidder at foreclosure sale).
"I' See Burkhart, supra note 5, at 344-49, 350-57, 384-90. A lender could opt not to
foreclose on contaminated property or delay foreclosure until after the property is cleaned
up. In light of the SARA amendments, this may be a favorable alternative, as the cost of a
CERCLA cleanup may greatly exceed the outstanding loan or value of the property. See id.
at 344-49. The lender could foreclose, assume ownership, and attempt to avoid liability
under the third party defense. Id. at 350-57. The lender, if sued, could join the borrower as
a third party defendant or sue the borrower for contribution. See id. at 384-90 (discussion of
lender/owners rights to contribution).
110 See, e.g., id. at 334 (CERCLA liability scheme forces those benefitting from dump-
ing activities to internalize costs caused by unsafe disposal practices and utilize safety dis-
posal methods to avoid future liability); Comment, supra note 2, at 183-85 (discussion of
CERCLA liability scheme creating incentives for safer disposal practices).
I See generally Angelo & Bergeson, The Expanding Scope of Liability for Environ-
mental Damage and its Impact on Business Transactions, 8 CORP. L. Rnv. 101, 113-21
(1985) (discussing, inter alia, warranties, indemnification agreements, certification, and no-
tice and disclosure requirements); Dragna, Contaminated Collateral: How Lenders Can Re-
duce Their Environmental Exposure, 10 L.A. LAw. 25, 30 (Jan. 1988) (recommending envi-
ronmental questionnaires and environmental liability checklists for use by lenders); James,
supra note 63, at 353-55 (discussion of lenders conducting environmental audits/programs
and assessments of potential borrowers facilities as a prerequisite to acquiring loan);
Marcotte, supra note 4, at 68-70 (same).
"'2 See Klotz & Siakotos, supra note 6, at 286 (conditions placed on defense may re-
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from dumping hazardous waste on its property or may be
prompted to utilize safer disposal methods. Second, because Fleet
Factors and Mirabile expanded the activities lenders may partici-
pate in, lenders will have more leeway in monitoring the use of the
mortgaged property Without forfeiting the security interest
exemption. 113
CONCLUSION
As applied in the commercial lending arena, CERCLA
presents a conflict between two competing policies: the environ-
mental policy of providing effective and manageable standards for
the cleanup of hazardous waste disposal sites to protect public
health and the environment, and the equally compelling policy of
affording protection to the rights and interests of innocent parties.
The Mirabile court clearly subordinated the environmental policy
by liberally construing CERCLA's security interest exemption and,
by creating a special class of owners exempt from liability, ren-
dered a decision inconsistent with Congress' purposes and goals in
enacting the statute. The MB&T court achieved a balance between
the two concerns by narrowly reading the exemption, holding the
acquisition of title at foreclosure to be the standard for imposing
liability. In so doing, the court properly recognized that upon ac-
quiring title, the lender's security interest terminates and ripens
into full ownership. While the decision in Fleet Factors preserves
the security interest exemption for nonforeclosing lenders, the po-
tential for CERCLA lender liability remains alarming. Therefore,
more circumspect lending policies and programs should be insti-
tuted by creditors. Such actions would aid in the protection of
lenders' rights, while having the salutary side effect of forcing bor-
rowers to utilize safer disposal methods. Thus, both policies under-
lying CERCLA-the effective cleanup of the environment and the
insulation from liability of innocent lenders-would be fulfilled.
Carolyn C. Cornell
quire lender to fully investigate condition of property prior to foreclosing or making loan).
11" See Note, supra note 10, at 1295. One commentator urges that further expansion of
these activities may be necessary to effectuate the goal of safer waste disposal while still
enabling lenders to fall within the security interest exemption. Id.; see also Comment, supra
note 2, at 180-81 (courts' narrower interpretation of "management" will allow lenders to
have some influence over borrowers' hazardous waste activities, "a result which is more ben-
eficial to the lender, the borrower, and society").
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